This paper analyzes the effect of the Earned Income Tax Credit (EITC) on investment income. Policy-makers have devoted substantial time and resources toward increasing the saving rate of low-income households, yet the EITC provides a substantial disincentive for individuals to save and realize investment income. I find that a 1 percent increase in the after-tax return to saving causes a 3.05 percent increase in investment income. Nearly 40 percent of the decline over the last two decades in the fraction of EITC recipients with savings in income-bearing accounts can be explained by changing EITC incentives.
I. INTRODUCTION
P olicy-makers have devoted substantial time and resources toward increasing the saving rate of low-income households with programs like the Saver's Credit and Individual Development Accounts. Yet the Earned Income Tax Credit (EITC) -the largest federal cash transfer program in the United States -provides a substantial disincentive for individuals to save and realize investment income because EITC benefits decline as investment income rises over certain income ranges. Over the last two decades, an average of 17.6 percent of low-income households that claim the EITC have some dividend and interest income. But, strikingly, the fraction has declined by more than 50 percent over time, from 26.2 percent in 1988 to just 12.3 percent in 2006. In this paper, I determine the extent to which the disincentive to save created by the EITC has contributed to the decline in saving in income-bearing accounts. I use Individual Public Use Tax Files for 1988-2006, which contain U.S. tax return data on a random stratified cross-sectional sample of individual income tax returns. This paper uses two different sources of variation in the implicit EITC tax rate in the region in which the EITC benefit is declining (known as the phase-out tax rate) in order to examine the degree to which investment income falls as the phase-out tax rate rises. The main estimates come from a difference-in-differences specification, which exploits differences in tax rate changes between taxpayers with differing numbers of dependents. The extensive margin estimates imply that nearly 40 percent of the decline over the last two decades in the fraction of EITC recipients with savings in income-bearing accounts can be explained by changing EITC incentives. The elasticity of investment income is 3.05; that is, a 1 percent increase in the after-tax return to saving increases the amount of investment income by 3.05 percent. Given the increase in the phase-out tax rate over this period, this elasticity estimate implies that the average savings stock would be $427.78 higher in 2006 for EITC recipients in the phase-out region if the disincentives to save had remained at their 1988 level.
The second identification strategy examines a narrow region around the second EITC tax kink. Below this tax kink, there is no implicit tax on a marginal dollar of income. Above this tax kink, the phase-out tax rate applies on the margin to all types of adjusted gross income (AGI) -earned income, non-labor income, and deductions -for most households. Investment income -the most prevalent type of non-labor incomedeclines above the tax kink, where the after-tax return to saving is lower. The implied elasticity of investment income with respect to the after-tax return to saving, which bounds the true elasticity from below, is 1.56. Moreover, along the intensive margin, I find that the non-labor income distortions are far larger than the earned income distortions for wage-earning individuals. A key advantage of exploiting both types of variation is that the assumptions required in order to obtain consistent estimates are unrelated in the two cases. The fact that the results from both approaches are similar provides additional credibility to the estimates obtained.
The paper proceeds as follows. Section II provides relevant background information on the EITC, as well as a brief literature review. Section III discusses the data and provides an overview of the empirical strategies. Section IV conducts the differencein-differences estimation. Section V conducts the estimation around the second tax kink. Section VI concludes.
II. BACKGROUND

A. EITC Details
The EITC, which was introduced in 1975, has expanded over time and is now the largest federal cash transfer program in the United States. The EITC is administered through the tax system, which is not true of other major cash transfer programs in the United States. This means that the credit is received as a lump sum annually and is based on annual income, whereas other transfer programs are administered at a monthly frequency. 1 The federal EITC is refundable, which allows households to receive the benefit even if it is larger than their taxes they owe. Some states also offer a credit, which usually takes the form of a "piggy-back" credit (i.e., it is calculated as a percentage of the federal credit). The state credit is usually refundable.
When determining the EITC amount, several types of income are relevant. Earned income is defined as wage and salary income plus self-employment income (minus onehalf the self-employment tax in the years [1990] [1991] [1992] [1993] [1994] [1995] [1996] [1997] [1998] [1999] [2000] [2001] [2002] [2003] [2004] [2005] [2006] , where self-employment income includes income from a sole proprietorship or a farm. 2 Non-labor income includes categories such as investment income and unemployment insurance receipts; for a complete list, see Section III.A. Deductions have varied over time; examples include alimony paid, moving expenses, and IRA contributions. 3 I will refer to non-labor income minus deductions as unearned income. AGI, which is a term used on the tax form, is the sum of earned and unearned income.
The EITC schedule consists of three regions -the phase-in region, the plateau region, and the phase-out region -and is depicted in Figure 1 . The example shown in Figure 1 is for taxpayers with two children and reflects the tax schedule in real dollars for unmarried taxpayers in [1996] [1997] [1998] [1999] [2000] [2001] [2002] [2003] [2004] [2005] [2006] (it also applies for married filers in [1996] [1997] [1998] [1999] [2000] [2001] .
When an individual has no earned income, the EITC credit is zero. In the phase-in region, the implicit marginal tax rate is negative (the benefit is increasing); in the plateau region, the implicit marginal tax rate is zero (the benefit is constant); and, in the phase-out region, the implicit marginal tax rate is positive (the benefit is declining). When the end of the phase-out region is reached, the credit is again zero. The solid line in the top figure is the EITC schedule as depicted in the existing EITC literature. It applies anytime an individual has no or negative unearned income, which is true for 75 percent of two-child EITC filers in 1996-2006. When an individual has positive unearned income, it is included as income for the purposes of calculating the EITC when AGI is above the second kink (i.e., the individual is in the phase-out region). When AGI is above the second kink, a filer's EITC is the minimum of the benefit as determined by their earned income and the benefit given by their AGI. In the top, two-dimensional graph, this can be depicted by shifting the solid phase-out region line toward the dashed line (or even past it). The phase-out region is shifted in for 25 percent of two-child filers in [1996] [1997] [1998] [1999] [2000] [2001] [2002] [2003] [2004] [2005] [2006] ; the median amount of unearned income for these taxpayers whose phase-out region is shifted inward is $1,227. Approximately one-fifth of these households who face an inward shift in their phase-out region, or 5 percent of two-child filers overall, have unearned income that is sizable enough that they face no plateau region at all, facing a spike instead. Note that the location of the second kink appears to be person-specific only because the horizontal axis in Figure 1 is earned income, while AGI is the variable determining the EITC benefit received for most households. The bottom two figures further illuminate the interaction between earned and unearned income in determining a household's EITC by plotting a three-dimensional graph in earned income, unearned income, and EITC benefit. As earned income rises, the EITC first rises and then falls. As unearned income rises, it first has no effect on the EITC and then causes it to decline at a certain threshold, where the threshold varies based on the household's earned income. Households without children became eligible for the EITC after 1994, but the phase-out region occurs at a very low income level ($6,710 in 2006 dollars), so I do not anticipate that these individuals have a substantial investment income response (or have much investment income). They are also a relatively poor comparison group for families with children. Therefore, these individuals are not included in the analysis.
B. Related Literature
There is a substantial literature on low-income saving decisions, but the effect of the EITC on saving behavior has never been examined beyond the role played by the lump sum nature of its distribution. This section provides a brief overview of existing work on the EITC and saving decisions of low-income households as it relates to this paper.
There is a large literature on the effect of the EITC on labor supply, the source of true earned income. The overall effect of the EITC on labor supply is theoretically ambiguous because the phase-in region encourages work, and the phase-out region discourages work on the margin. The literature generally finds that the EITC increases work, mostly on the extensive margin, for single individuals. 4 True earned income may not equal earned income reported to the tax authorities. Studies that make use of tax return data distinguish between wage-earning and self-employed individuals. These studies find that, while the intensive margin response by wage-earning individuals is approximately zero, there is a substantial response among the self-employed, and there is a larger response in the phase-in region (LaLumia, 2009; Saez, 2010) . This response is a combination of labor supply, tax avoidance, and tax evasion responses.
There are several other relevant facts from the EITC literature that are important to note for my analysis below. Blumenthal, Erard, and Ho (2005) estimate that 89 percent of EITC individuals above the filing threshold claim the EITC credit if eligible. 5 Thus, most EITC-eligible individuals in the region I examine will be observed in the tax return data. McCubbin (2000) finds that claiming an extra dependent to which the taxpayer is not entitled increases with EITC generosity and decreases with income. Given this, I consider possible biases induced in the estimates in Section IV if individuals manipulate the number of children they report. Lastly, Joulfaian and Rider (1996) show that 4 See Hotz and Scholz (2003) for an extensive review of the EITC literature through 2002. More recently, Chetty, Friedman, and Saez (2013) found an intensive margin response among individuals in areas with high EITC awareness. 5 The fraction was substantially lower if the taxpayer was below the filing threshold. The second EITC kink is near (within $1,000) or above the filing threshold for all years.
wage earners do not tend to evade by adjusting their earned income, but self-employed individuals do. There is a literature on the saving decisions of low-income households, but this literature does not focus on the role played by the EITC. 6 One strand of this literature examines the effects of other need-based programs, such as AFDC/TANF and Medicaid, on savings. Hubbard, Skinner, and Zeldes (1995) show that these programs affect savings decisions both because they decrease the need for precautionary savings in case of a negative income shock and because the asset limits imposed by these programs create a high implicit tax rate when binding. Gruber and Yelowitz (1999) find empirical evidence supporting these theoretical results in the context of Medicaid. In contrast, recent papers examining the effect of AFDC/TANF asset limits on liquid assets, such as saving accounts, find no substantial effect (Hurst and Ziliak, 2006; Sullivan, 2006) . The EITC changes the after-tax return on savings for individuals in the phase-out region, providing a mechanism to decrease savings in addition to asset limits or precautionary savings. This mechanism will be the primary focus of this paper, but precautionary savings motives will be discussed when relevant in Section IV. The asset limits are much more likely to be binding in the case of TANF or Medicaid because those limits are effectively much lower than the limit introduced for the EITC in 1996.
A separate literature examines the effectiveness of programs designed to induce low-income individuals to save more. In addition to providing evidence on the degree to which individuals can be encouraged to save more, this literature also highlights a recent policy focus on increasing saving by low-income households. One popular program is Individual Development Accounts (IDA), which encourage individuals to save by providing matching funds (up to a limit each year) for income saved in these accounts. The individuals receive the matching funds when they withdraw their savings for qualified purposes (e.g., buying a house or paying for college). Over 400 IDA programs existed by 2006, which were funded privately or by states. Mills et al. (2008) examine a particular IDA program in Oklahoma with a randomized design; they find a large IDA take-up rate among the treated group (almost 90 percent). Those with IDA accounts are more likely to purchase a home, but this is partly offset by a decrease in other assets (this IDA provided a larger match when the funds were withdrawn for home purchases), and a recent follow-up shows that the increase in likelihood of purchasing a home is short-lived (Grinstein-Weiss et al., 2013) .
Another program, the Saver's Credit, was implemented through the tax system in 2002 to encourage saving for retirement among low-income individuals. The literature found this credit has little impact on saving; for example, see Ramnath (2013) . Duflo et al. (2006) conduct a randomized field experiment of a program similar in spirit to the Saver's Credit, and find that this program can induce individuals to save more. They cite differences between their experiment and the Saver's Credit, such as the complexity and non-refundability of the Saver's Credit, as likely reasons for their experiment having a greater effect on saving.
The existing EITC literature has found little effect of the EITC on labor supply decisions along the intensive margin (except perhaps for self-employed individuals). My paper examines the extent to which the EITC has an effect on another marginnon-labor income, particularly investment income -which has not been previously examined. Given the existing literature on low-income saving, the degree to which the EITC will affect low-income saving is not obvious because the effects of other programs on low-income saving are mixed.
III. EMPIRICAL STRATEGY
This section provides an overview of the empirical strategy used in this paper. Because the methods used in each section are quite different, the details can be found in their respective sections. Subsection III.A provides a detailed description of the data. Subsection III.B explains the focus of this paper, the degree to which a change in saving in an income-bearing account reflects an actual change in savings, and the different forms of variation used for identification in each section. Subsection III.C discusses the central role of awareness in studying the impact of the EITC on saving, which is key to interpreting the estimates.
A. Data
This paper uses the Individual Public Use Tax Files for 1988-2006, which were created by the Statistics of Income Division of the Internal Revenue Service. The sample is stratified, so all estimates are population weighted. Some components of AGIwage and salary income, alimony paid, and alimony received -are blurred in the tax return data for low-income households in the years 1996-2006. 7 Alimony income was blurred at the national level. Wage and salary income was blurred at the national level in 1996, at the state level for years 1997-1999, and at the state × married level for years [2000] [2001] [2002] [2003] [2004] [2005] [2006] . The blurring was done as follows: "for every three records, in descending order, the average … [of a given income type to be blurred] has been determined and that value has been placed in the … field for each of the three records" (Weber, 2001, p. 3) . This means that earned income for all taxpayers that have positive wage earnings is measured with noise in the years in which blurring occurred. An alternative measure of earnings can be constructed by backing out earned income from AGI. This measure is also imperfect because most, but not all, types of unearned income are reported in the tax return data, and those that are also blurred must be excluded. 8 I use the latter measure for all years, so the accuracy of my imputation method can be precisely determined. In years before blurring, the latter measure is within $15 of the actual wage earnings for 99.5 percent of taxpayers for the sample used in Section IV. In years after blurring, blurred wage earnings are within $15 of the latter measure 65 percent of the time, indicating that there is substantial noise in blurred wage earnings. Still, the estimates are robust to the use of either measure; for example, the baseline estimates in Section IV decline by about 2 percent when the blurred wage earnings is used instead. Table 1 provides descriptive statistics for all EITC-eligible households for 1988-2006. The first two rows summarize the components of earned income. Almost 16 percent of households have some self-employment income, but it is the sole source of earned income for only 2.8 percent of taxpayers. The third row provides summary statistics for total unearned income, and the next nine rows break out unearned income by type. 9 Note that 33.7 percent of households have some unearned income, with a mean of $563.51. The most frequent type of unearned income is dividend and interest income (18.6 percent). A substantial number of households have unemployment insurance (10.6 percent). Individuals will not adjust this form of income directly in response to the EITC schedule (because it does not pay to give up a dollar of unemployment insurance to obtain 10 cents to 20 cents of EITC benefits), but it may be adjusted indirectly if individuals change the number of weeks worked in response to the EITC. Conditional on filing a tax form, approximately 92 percent of EITC-eligible households claim the EITC. 10 As noted in Subsection II.A, I exclude those with no dependents. For most of the analysis in Section IV, I restrict the sample to those with one or two dependents; for comparability, I impose the same restriction throughout the paper. The mean number of dependents is 1.41. 11 The analysis of tax return data has several advantages. Most importantly, it provides a precise (or near precise) measure of the reported amount of each type of income, and is not subject to survey non-response, rounding, and other approximations. The main disadvantage of tax return data is that one cannot observe where households place the money that they would have held in an income-bearing account in the absence of a 8 The latter affects a relatively small number of households in the sample used in this paper. 9 Unearned income does not include blurred sources (alimony) and unreported sources (other income and a few deductions). Less than 1 percent of households in this sample have alimony income. In the years before the blurring of low-income wage data was instituted, I can back out unearned income directly by subtracting earned income from AGI. The likelihood that households have unearned income in these years (1988) (1989) (1990) (1991) (1992) (1993) (1994) (1995) is 1.4 percentage points higher using this measure. 10 The actual number is a bit higher; eligibility is not perfectly measured with the data available. 11 Dependents do not always correspond exactly to the number of children claimed for EITC purposes; the latter is not in this data set for all years. For years in which both are available, the actual measure is about one-tenth of a child lower. In addition to data availability, the advantage of using dependents is that it avoids additional manipulation of claiming children only for the purpose of maximizing the EITC. For years in which I have both measures, the baseline estimates decline slightly when the actual measure is used, but the estimates are not statistically different.
positive tax rate or those that do not file. For welfare, both moving the money out of the income-bearing account (assuming this is not costless) and a real decline in saving are relevant. Tax evasion on investment income is also a potential drawback, although I will provide some evidence that evasion is likely not a key mechanism behind the results found.
B. Research Design
The research question examined in this paper is whether the design of the EITC has the unintended consequence of distorting non-labor-income decisions in the phaseout region, particularly the decision to save in an income-bearing account. This paper focuses mostly on the decision to save in an interest-or dividend-bearing account. I also analyze a broader measure of investment income, which includes capital gains and losses, partnership income, other gains and losses, and IRA contributions (IRA contributions are a deduction). I focus on a particular part of unearned income because unearned income contains a broad range of income sources. As a result, the coefficient on unearned income does not have much policy relevance outside of choosing an optimal EITC design. In contrast, examining the effect of the EITC on saving of low-income households fits into the substantial literature on the effect of mean-tested programs on savings. Moreover, unearned income contains both types of income one would expect to be responsive to the tax rate (e.g., interest income) and types that one would not (e.g., Social Security benefits). The decision to save in an interest-or dividend-bearing account is related, but not identical, to the decision to save, as the EITC could induce individuals to stop saving in interest-or dividend-bearing accounts, instead placing their money in an interest-free account. This paper cannot speak to this mechanism, but this response is distortionary and presumably not a behavior policymakers would like to encourage. There are several other reasons why the measured response may not be identical to the decision to save. First, if two taxpayers are cohabiting, one could save while the other claims the child and gets the EITC. I cannot examine this response because I do not observe tax returns of two separate cohabiters. Second, individuals could save in an interest-or dividendbearing account but choose not to report it on their tax return -tax evasion. I argue that tax evasion is unlikely because there is information reporting by financial institutions on interest and dividend income above $10 per account, but it is possible, particularly for those with dividend or interest income less than $10. In Section IV, I provide evidence that, under reasonable assumptions, any evasion of taxes on investment income has a minimal effect on the results. Going forward, much of the discussion will proceed as though households are altering their real savings decisions, but readers should keep in mind that the estimates in this paper are reduced-form.
To identify the effect of the EITC phase-out tax rate on the decision to save in an income-bearing account, I exploit two different forms of variation in the tax rate faced. Section IV considers the feature that the phase-out tax rate has varied depending on the number of dependents a household claims since 1991. It exploits this variation using a difference-in-differences estimator. The second source of variation used in this paper uses variation in the marginal EITC tax rate just above the second EITC kink, relative to the marginal EITC rate just below. Section V provides evidence on the overall response in earned and unearned income above the second kink, as well as which types of income are most responsive to the higher tax rate above the second kink, and thus driving the overall response.
An advantage of these two different forms of identification is that they require unrelated identifying assumptions. The estimation strategy in Section IV requires that the composition or secular behavior of those observed with one or two dependents cannot change differentially for one relative to two dependents in a way that is correlated with changes in the tax rate and outcomes. The key identification assumption for estimating the response of investment income in Section V is that investment income as a fraction of AGI is constant, on average, in the region around the second EITC tax kink if no tax kink existed in this region. The fact that the results from both are similar provides additional credibility to the estimates obtained.
Households receiving the EITC are also subject to the regular tax schedule and may also be receiving subsidies from other cash transfer programs, such as AFDC/TANF, Medicaid, and food stamps/SNAP. These interactions will matter only if changes in these programs coincide with changes in the EITC tax rate and also discourage saving. Often, households in the phase-out region are not eligible to receive benefits from these other need-based programs. Moreover, the disincentives to save from these programs declined (while the disincentives from the EITC increased) over the period I examine and the decline in disincentives did not vary by number of children (Hurst and Ziliak, 2006; Gruber and Yelowitz, 1999) , which means that these programs are unlikely to bias my results. Regarding the regular tax schedule, interactions between the EITC schedule and the regular tax schedule will be discussed below when they are important for the analysis.
C. Awareness
Awareness of the tax system is important in studies where the treatment is the marginal tax rate faced, because households must know and respond to the tax rate they will face in advance; this is in contrast to more standard treatment effect studies (e.g., the effect of a job training program) in which individuals necessarily know the treatment they receive before responding. When individuals are filing their tax return, it is too late to respond, except by engaging in tax evasion or making an IRA contribution. 12 The literature finds that awareness of detailed features of the EITC schedule is limited (Liebman, 1998; Romich and Weisner, 2000; , and the level of awareness varies by geography across the United States (Chetty, Friedman, and Saez, 2013) .
Awareness matters for several reasons. First, for individuals to respond, they must be aware that their unearned income is taxed if they are in the phase-out region. This fact has often been ignored in the EITC literature; however, it is prominent when taxpayers fill out the form to calculate their EITC. 13 If (and only if) households' AGI places them in the phase-out region, they are asked to calculate their credit based on their earned income and then again based on their AGI. They are then required to take the minimum of the two credit amounts. If their AGI makes them ineligible for the credit, they are stopped before they start to fill in the form. Thus, individuals who are filing for the first time, or even are in the phase-out region for the first time, may be unaware until they file. This is too late for the individuals to respond, unless they decide to engage in tax evasion or make IRA contributions.
Second, for individuals to respond, they must be aware of changes in the phase-out tax rate over time. Third, individuals must know whether they will be in the phase-out region, and thus face the phase-out tax rate, in advance. The EITC schedule is inflationindexed with a lag. For example, the inflation parameter used to calculate the 2006 tax schedule was the CPI for September 2004-August 2005. Rounding is then used (usually the values are rounded down to the nearest $50). For this reason, it is unlikely that households' income will naturally move in lock step with the tax kink. An individual can know at the beginning of the tax year what the tax parameters will be and respond accordingly, but this requires the individual to look up the tax kink location each year. As a household's income gets further away from the tax kink, the amount of awareness necessary for it to know the treatment faced and respond accordingly decreases, because the household can more easily guess whether or not it will remain in the phase-out region.
The baseline estimates in Sections IV and V ignore awareness. The estimates in Section V are expected to be lower than those in Section IV precisely because they require a greater degree of awareness to respond each year in a narrow region around the tax kink than somewhere in the phase-out region. Several additional specifications in Section IV will analyze ways in which individuals become more or less aware of EITC-related incentives, including their use of a paid preparer and having unemployment insurance (where unemployment insurance is considered a rough proxy for whether the household experiences a transitory earnings shock).
IV. DIFFERENCE-IN-DIFFERENCES ESTIMATES
This section examines the responsiveness of investment income to the EITC phase-out marginal tax rate, exploiting differential variation in the phase-out rate between one-and two-dependent families. I find that the response in investment income is substantial. There is no evidence that bias-inducing selection or tax evasion is driving the results.
I define a region based on earned income within the phase-out region and identify the parameters of interest by relying on differential variation in the marginal tax rates between families with one and two children. 14 Defining the region in this way will not necessarily yield consistent estimates if earned income responds to the tax rate. The analysis of earned income that will be presented in Section V is consistent with the assumption that earned income does not respond to the tax rate for wage earners but does respond to the tax rate for self-employed households. Therefore, I restrict the sample to wage-earning households. Because I cannot completely rule out a small earned income response among wage earners, I discuss the conditions under which such a response would induce a bias in the estimates, and provide evidence that this form of selection does not appear to be having a statistically significant impact on the estimates later in this section.
The identifying variation in this section comes from the differential variation in the phase-out EITC rate between one-and two-child families over time. This variation is plotted in Figure 2 , where I plot the marginal net-of-tax rate, which is one minus the marginal tax rate; this is the variable that will be used in the main estimating equation. Given the form of identifying variation, the specifications in this section assume that households do not make endogenous fertility decisions or decisions to claim an extra dependent in a way that is correlated with their investment income response. These types of exogeneity conditions are assumed in much of the EITC literature, as most of it relies on differential variation in tax rates across the number of children for identification. I consider this story later in this section and find no evidence that the estimates are biased by households selecting the number of children they have in a way that is correlated with their outcomes.
Before proceeding to the main estimation, I provide graphical evidence of the response in investment income over time by number of children and estimate a binary treatment difference-in-differences equation. For this analysis, I split the years into two groups, pre and post. Pre includes all years through the end of the EITC expansion (1988) (1989) (1990) (1991) (1992) (1993) (1994) (1995) , and post includes all years after the expansion (1996) (1997) (1998) (1999) (2000) (2001) (2002) (2003) (2004) (2005) (2006) . I estimate the following difference-in-differences intent-to-treat (ITT) specification for wage-earning households with earned income in the range $18,000-$30,000, 15
where g is the parameter of interest, INV it is an indicator for whether a household has positive interest or dividend income, twokids it is an indicator for whether the household has more than one child, post it is an indicator for the observation being in 1996-2006, X it are additional covariates, and h t are year fixed-effects. Including post it as a separate variable in the regression is redundant because year fixed-effects are included. There are other plausible ways one could specify this binary regression; for example, one could define the pre-period as the years in which there were no differences between one and two child households (1988) (1989) (1990) or as the years before the 1993 reform that started the phase-in of a much larger difference between the rates for one-and twochild households (1988) (1989) (1990) (1991) (1992) (1993) . All these nuances will be captured when we consider a continuous measure of treatment later in this section.
The vector X it includes earnings, earnings squared, married, and an interaction of twokids it with earnings, earnings squared, and married. I pool data over all years in the sample. All income values are in 2006 dollars. 16 I choose $18,000 as the lower cutoff because it is at least $1,000 above the second kink point in all years; thus, the estimates will likely not capture bunching decisions around the kink point. The cutoff is above the filing threshold for each type of marital status and above the positive tax rate threshold for all single and head of household taxpayers but not for married individuals, for whom the positive tax rate is implemented part way through the window examined in this section. However, given that families with one dependent face this positive tax rate first, this will bias the estimates downward, because it will make one-dependent families appear more responsive relative to two-dependent households. Earned income of $30,000 was chosen as the baseline upper bound because it is at least $1,000 below the end of the phase-out region for all years. The baseline estimates are robust to the choice of upper and lower bound, which will be shown in Table 4 .
I drop households with more than $2,300 of investment income. The EITC definition of investment income is dividend, interest, tax-exempt interest, and positive capital gain income. This decision is driven by the fact that there was an asset limit imposed in 1996, excluding those with more than $2,800 of investment income in 2006 dol-15 It is an ITT specification because I assume everyone in this region takes up the EITC and is affected by associated tax changes based on the number of children they have. Thus, we are estimating the response as if all these households faced these tax changes. In fact, they all do not; some do not take up the EITC, and others that look eligible based on their earned income are not in fact eligible based on their AGI. 16 I use the IRS deflator: the average CPI-U from September year t -2 through August year t -1. lars from claiming the EITC. 17 Before 1996, 1.1 percent of two-child families held investment income over this limit and were 10 percent more likely to have investment income over the limit than one-child families. Two-child families are also more apt to respond to the limit by decreasing their investment income below the threshold because they will lose more in benefits than an equivalent one-child household. Consequently, estimates that include households with investment income over the limit or impose the limit after 1996 will be biased upward. I impose a limit of $500 less than $2,800 to avoid differential rates of selection by number of children into having investment income just under the cutoff. Table 2 provides descriptive statistics for the baseline specification. Average interest and dividend income reported, including all zeros, is $48.60. About 20 percent of households have positive interest and dividend income. Almost one-third of the sample is married, the average number of children is 1.4, and 59 percent use a paid preparer.
The estimated g from (1) is -0.037, and the p-value is 0.001. The main estimation below defines treatment as log(1 -t). Rescaling g using two-stage least squares so that it is directly comparable to the main estimates yields an estimate of 0.745 (p-value: 0.002). This estimate implies that, for a 1 percent decrease in the marginal net-of-tax rate, the likelihood a household opens an interest-or dividend-bearing account declines by 0.007. For example, if the saving rate were 0.4 before a 10 percent decline in the marginal net-of-tax rate (e.g., from 30 to 27 percent), it would be 0.33 afterwards. The standard errors are clustered by state. In the early years, when there was no (or a small) difference between the tax rates for one-and two-child households, their investment income was not statistically distinguishable, suggesting that one-child families 17 There are a few special circumstances when this limit does not hold. 18 Another type of selection could occur if filing increased after the phase-out rate increased (which coincided with an increase in EITC generosity), and these new filers were much less likely to have investment income. I cannot completely rule this out, but while EITC claims were rising there was no discrete jump at 1996, nor is the pattern consistent with the pattern in Figure 3 . Adding a control for the total number of EITC claimants by year has a minimal effect on the estimates. provide a good comparison group for two-child families. It takes a year or two for individuals to adjust to the new tax rates, which is consistent with other EITC literature (Saez, 2010) . In 1996, there is a statistically significant drop in the likelihood that twochild families have investment income, and this difference remains significant through 2006. This graphical evidence is consistent with the estimates obtained from the simple difference-in-differences estimates; the gap between the likelihood that taxpayers with one and two children have investment income is about 0.03 in the post-period, and this increase is stable over time. A similarly compelling figure for the percent change in investment income over time is provided in Appendix Figure A1 . The main specification takes advantage of all the variation in log(1 -t) by including it directly and estimating the following ITT regression,
with the same covariates and sample restrictions as for (1). Estimating the response of investment income to the after-tax rate of return log((1 -t it )r t ), where r t is the average annual real interest rate, is equivalent to the specification above because log((1 -t it )r t ) = log(1 -t it ) + log(r t ), and there are year fixed-effects. 19 The pattern of investment choices over time in Figure 3 suggests a lag in the response to changing tax rates; 20 however, I am not able to quantify statistically the lag effect because there is not enough identifying variation in this sample to estimate the response to both the current and lagged tax rate with statistical precision. The estimates given by (3) produce ITT estimates because all households are included as long as they have earned income in the specified range, regardless of whether they actually decide to claim the EITC or are eligible based on their overall AGI level. 21 In Tables 3 and 4 the top row estimates the extensive margin effect of the marginal net-of-tax rate on the decision to invest -the dependent variable is an indicator for whether the household receives any interest or dividend income. These estimates are
Figure 3
Likelihood Individuals Have Investment Income by Year and Number of Dependents 20 Gelber, Jones, and Sachs (2014) also find a lagged response to policy changes, albeit in a different context -the Social Security earnings test. 21 It also ignores other tax rates and credits faced. I choose not to report treatment on the treated (TOT) estimates to address these issues because the value of such estimates is limited. The estimates are quite similar in practice (only 4 percent of my baseline sample was not EITC-eligible) and, in this context, given the nature of the selection and its correlation with the ITT measure, Weber (2014) shows that the estimate will be biased. mean marginal effects from a probit specification. Normally, we think the average tax rate is the relevant rate in the context of extensive margin decisions; in this context, the average and the marginal tax rates on investment income are equivalent because all households are in the phase-out region based exclusively on their wage income, so all investment income faces the EITC phase-out tax rate. The bottom row estimates the elasticity of dividend and interest income with respect to the marginal net-of-tax rate. These estimates come from a two-tiered model proposed by Cragg (1971) ; it is also referred to as a hurdle model. 22 The first tier estimates the extensive margin decision using the same probit model from the top row. The second tier estimates the intensive margin effect (i.e., conditional on choosing to save a positive amount, how much does the household save) using a truncated normal regression, where the dependent variable is the log of interest and dividend income. Taking the log of interest and dividend income is attractive because the specification directly produces an elasticity, and it is necessary because the unscaled dependent variable has a large left skew that, if left untransformed, would violate the assumptions of the estimation method. The reported coefficients are mean marginal effects from this two-tier model. Standard errors were calculated using 1,000 bootstrap replications. The second tier is not itself statistically significant, which suggests that the behavioral response occurs along the extensive margin and the elasticities reported in the bottom panel of Table 3 are mostly capturing the average amount by which dividend and interest income changes when households open or close an interest-or dividend-bearing account. The standard errors in Tables 3  and 4 are clustered by state. 23 Table 3 presents results,with baseline estimates provided in Column 1. The extensive margin estimate is 0.612, which means that a 1 percent increase in the marginal net-oftax rate increases the probability of having interest or dividend income by 0.006. The phase-out marginal net-of-tax rate decreased by 9.6 percent over the last two decades, 24 which implies a 0.058 decrease in the likelihood that households had interest or dividend income. The decrease in the likelihood that EITC recipients had interest or dividend income in this population is 0.134; hence among those examined in this section, 43.5 percent of the decline in the fraction of EITC recipients with savings in income-bearing accounts over the last two decades can be explained by changing EITC incentives. For all wage-earner EITC recipients, 33.7 percent of the decline can be explained by changing EITC incentives.
The elasticity estimate is 3.047, which implies that a 1 percent decrease in the marginal net-of-tax rate decreases interest and dividend income by 3.047 percent. Because the 22 A hurdle model is preferred over a Tobit model in this context because a Tobit model forces all covariates to have the same effect on the extensive and intensive margin decisions, an assumption that we will see below is clearly violated for our tax rate variable of interest. 23 This accounts for serial correlation in income, and thus also savings, within a state over time. A two-way cluster by state and time (Cameron, Gelbach, and Miller, 2011) is ideal; however, there are likely not enough years to make the year cluster valid. Also I have computed the two-way standard errors and the state-only clustered standard errors are generally larger. 24 All percent changes calculated in this paper are calculated as the log change.
Table 3
Baseline Estimates
(1)
(3) Notes: The indicator heterogeneity stands for being married in Column 5, for receiving unemployment insurance in Column 6, for using a paid preparer in Column 7, and for being in a highly aware state in Column 8. All columns include covariates X and year fixed-effects. Standard errors clustered by state are in parentheses. Asterisks denote significance at the 1% (***), 5% (**), and 10% (*) levels.
phase-out marginal net-of-tax rate decreased by 9.6 percent over the last two decades, the amount of interest or dividend income held by the end of these two decades would have been 29.1 percent higher if the phase-out marginal net-of-tax rate had remained at its 1988 level. Average investment income was $73.45 for EITC recipients in 1988. If we assume a 5 percent interest rate, and households spend their income (as opposed to saving it, but not placing it in an interest-or dividend-bearing account), this implies the average savings stock in 1988 was $1,469.01. A 29.1 percent decrease in this value would decrease the savings stock to $1,041.24. Hence, by 2006, the savings stock per household would have been $427.78 higher, on average, if the disincentives to save had remained at their 1988 level. This figure would be even higher if I allowed for the likely possibility that households reinvest their interest or dividend income each year, which creates a compounding effect over time of any loss in savings. Table 3 , Column 2 examines a broader measure of investment income, including capital gains or losses, partnership income, other gains or losses, and IRA contributions; 25 this has a minimal effect on the estimates. I exclude capital gains in the baseline estimates because these gains are a lumpy realization of savings, rather than reflective of the annual amount of savings. There is also a large capacity to re-time the sale of an asset to a period in which the tax rate is lower. Very few EITC eligible households have capital gains. Column 3 includes the controls X in a more flexible way, by interacting each control with an indicator variable for the observation occurring before 1992 and another for the observation occurring in 1998 or thereafter. The year 1992 is two years before the largest expansions in the gap between one-and two-child families, and 1998 is two years after the last change. This specification allows for different trends in investment income in the years before 1992 and after 1998. The estimates increase slightly, and the additional controls have a sizable effect on the standard errors; the estimates remain significant at the 5 percent level. 26 Column 4 adds state fixed-effects to control for differences in state EITC generosity, which has a minimal effect on the estimates and standard errors. Table 3 , Columns 5-8 examine heterogeneity in the baseline estimates by taxpayer type. For each type of heterogeneity considered, the indicator of taxpayer type (e.g., married) is interacted with the tax rate, as well as included directly and interacted with all the other covariates to control for underlying differences in investment income across different taxpayer types. Column 5 estimates the response separately for unmarried and married taxpayers. Married households are slightly less responsive than unmarried taxpayers, and the difference in responsiveness is highly insignificant. The lack of difference between these two types lends credibility to the identification used to identify separately income and substitution effects in Subsection IV.A.
Those who temporarily face the EITC schedule may be less responsive because savings is often a longer-term decision, and awareness of detailed features of the schedule may be low. Alternatively, if a household is a temporary EITC recipient because of an unemployment spell, their response could be more elastic, as it is an appealing time to draw down their savings. I use an unemployment insurance indicator as a proxy for temporarily facing the EITC schedule due to a negative shock in earned income; it is not a perfect proxy as a household could already be in the EITC range before their unemployment spell. The results are reported in Table 3 , Column 6. 27 They suggest that, on average, those with unemployment insurance receipts do not respond differently; the estimates are not statistically different. Table 3 , Column 7 considers how the response differs among those who do and do not use a paid preparer. 28 Those who choose to have a paid preparer may be more responsive to begin with, and the paid preparer may educate them about the costs and benefits associated with having investment income when in the phase-out region. Using a paid preparer in the current year can be interpreted as a proxy for having a paid preparer in the past. Learning in the current year is not helpful unless the tax preparer encourages individuals to engage in tax evasion, and this does not appear to be what is occurring because I find no evidence of tax evasion responding to tax rate changes in Section IV.A. The response of those who use a paid preparer is twice as large. Table 3 , Column 8 examines how the response differs among those in states who are in the top decile of self-employed bunching at the first EITC kink, relative to those in other states. 29 Chetty, Friedman, and Saez (2013) use this measure to identify locations with high average awareness levels of the incentives created by the EITC, relative to other locations. Given this, I would expect that households in states with higher awareness are likely to be more responsive than other households. I aggregate the bunching measure created in Chetty, Friedman, and Saez (2013) to the state level because zip codes are not available in my tax return data set. Because I can only exploit state variation, I am capturing not only higher levels of awareness of certain states, but also anything else that is unique to these states that affects household responsiveness. 30 I find that the response level of households in high-awareness states is about twice as large as the response overall, although the overall response also remains statistically significant. 31 Higher awareness could be leading to higher real responses, more tax avoidance, or 27 Unemployment insurance indicators and a complete set of interactions with the other covariates are included in the estimating equation to control for underlying differences in investment income among those with unemployment insurance. 28 Paid preparer usage and a complete set of interactions with paid preparer are included in the estimating equation to control for underlying differences among those with a paid preparer. 29 I construct the bunching measure as the average from years 1996-2006; I cannot exploit annual variation because this measure is first available in 1996 after all the EITC changes examined in this paper have taken place. 30 The bunching indicator and a complete set of interactions with this indicator are included in the estimating equation to control for underlying differences among those in highly aware states. 31 One potential caveat to this result is that Chetty, Friedman, and Saez (2013) find a significant response of earned income among wage-earning households that live in highly aware locations. Hence, we must rely particularly strongly on the assumption discussed in the next section that the response is the same across the income distribution. The same robustness check on the whole population regarding this assumption conducted in the next section produces qualitatively similar results if we apply it to this heterogeneity analysis. more tax evasion. However, I do provide some evidence in the next section that tax evasion is likely not driving the results in this paper. I next conduct a variety of sensitivity analyses, shown in Table 4 . It begins by considering two possible forms of selection discussed above, which could be biasing the estimates. Column 1 repeats Column 4 in Table 3 . The first type of selection occurs when households select into or out of the sample by adjusting their earned income in response to the EITC phase-out tax rate. If taxpayers are moving in and out of the sample and this is correlated with the likelihood they respond along the investment income margin (or have investment income), then the estimates may be biased. The estimates remain unbiased only if this selection is occurring at a constant rate -that is, if entry and exit are equal. Assuming a positive correlation among earned and investment income responses, the estimates will be biased downwards (upwards) if exit (entry) is larger. This occurs because those who are entering or exiting will adjust their investment income more to a given change in the marginal tax rate than households whose earned income does not respond to the tax change. When exit (entry) is larger, the estimates will exclude (include) more individuals that are highly responsive. The next section will find no evidence of a response in earned income; however, a small response among certain taxpayers could exist, particularly for the secondary earner of a married couple (Eissa and Hoynes, 2004) or for those in regions in which awareness of the EITC is high (Chetty, Friedman, and Saez, 2013) . If responsiveness changes monotonically with earned income, the entry and exit rates will converge as the estimation window narrows, making the bias decrease. Table 4 , Columns 2 and 3 separately estimate the response over $18,000-$24,000 and $24,000-$30,000; the estimates are less than one-fourth standard deviation from the baseline estimates, and the coefficients move in opposite directions relative to the baseline, providing no support for this type of bias-inducing selection.
Another potential obstacle to obtaining consistent estimates is that households can choose the number of children they wish to have (or to claim on their tax return). Empirically, the literature suggests that these responses are relatively small (Baughman and Dickert-Conlin, 2003; McCubbin, 2000) . This problem will bias the estimates upwards if the correlation between choosing to have a second child to obtain a higher EITC amount and choosing to have lower dividend and interest income is greater than the same correlation for choosing to have a first child. The incentives for having a first child are higher than those for having a second for all years in the sample, but the incentives for claiming a second child have increased over time more than those for having a first child. These changes are correlated with phase-out tax rate changes, which would bias the estimates upwards. While there is an incentive to claim a second child, there is no incentive to claim a third child, except in the state of Wisconsin. Table 4 , Column 4 drops two-child families and instead includes three-child families, removing the selection problem for two children but leaving the selection for one child; in this case, any selection for one-child families that is correlated with the phase-out tax rate will bias the estimates downwards. There are about four times fewer three-child than two-child families, which increases the standard errors, all else equal. While the estimates are no longer statistically significant, the point estimates are close to the baseline estimates. Notes: All columns include covariates X and year fixed-effects. Standard errors clustered by state are in parentheses. Asterisks denote significance at the 1% (***), 5% (**), and 10% (*) levels.
This provides evidence that selection into having a second child does not bias the baseline estimates. Table 4 , Column 5 estimates a related placebo test. If we include only households with two or three dependents, but assign taxpayers with three dependents the EITC phase-out tax rates as though they had one dependent, we would expect to estimate no response because both those with two and three dependents actually faced the same EITC tax rates in each year. This is exactly what we find -both the extensive margin and elasticity estimates are quite small in magnitude and highly insignificant.
While the existence of tax evasion would not bias the estimates, it would substantially change the interpretation and welfare implications of the results. In general, it is appropriate to assume that the elasticity of tax evasion with respect to the marginal net-of-tax rate is a function of the benefits associated with engaging in tax evasion. 32 In this context, this implies that there is more evasion below the information reporting threshold at $10, and evasion will increase as the marginal tax rate increases. Figure 4 provides evidence on the amount of interest income and dividend income evasion below the information reporting line. The estimates are based on the density test proposed by McCrary (2008) . I choose the bandwidth when the data are restricted to be $10 on either side of the tax notch (otherwise, the bandwidth would be too large to obtain a reasonable estimate below the notch). The analysis is done in nominal dollars.
The top panel of Figure 4 examines interest income for years 1988-2006. There is a 120 percent increase in the density just above the information reporting threshold, and this estimate is statistically significant at the 1 percent level. This suggests there is substantial evasion in interest income below $10, or alternatively that individuals often forget to report their interest income unless they receive a tax form (1099-INT) at the end of the year, which only occurs when there is information reporting. If the evasion elasticity with respect to the tax rate is increasing with an increase in the benefit, the jump should increase after 1996, relative to the small EITC years (1988) (1989) (1990) (1991) (1992) (1993) ; but neither of these are statistically different from the estimate for all years, and the post-1996 estimate is lower, not higher. This suggests evasion occurs, but it does not vary with the tax rate. The bottom panel considers dividend income. There does not appear to be evidence of evasion on this margin.
As another check on evasion below $10, Column 6 of Table 4 replaces all reports less than or equal to $10 with zeros for all years. This forces the response of all with income less than $10 to be zero, which eliminates any evasion response of these households, as well as any other response of these households. The estimates are slightly lower but not statistically different from the baseline estimates.
The analysis conducted thus far has estimated a single parameter capturing the response to the marginal tax rate. This parameter encompasses both a substitution and an income effect. In particular, an increase in the phase-out tax rate has two effects: 1) the marginal cost of holding a dollar in an interest-or dividend-bearing account increases (substitution effect); and 2) the households' wealth changes because the EITC amount changes (income effect). Wealth increases if the location of the end of the phase-out Notes: These estimates include any individual with positive interest or dividend income, subject to the baseline sample restrictions in Section IV. The implied log difference in density at the information reporting threshold is 1.20 (0.28) for interest income and 0.15 (0.42) for dividend income. The density estimates are normalized to integrate to one. The smoothed density estimates do not start at zero because they cannot be estimated accurately (or they could but not with the same bandwidth) until interest or dividend income is greater than or equal to the bandwidth. region is held fixed. The sign of the income effect is ambiguous. As the EITC increases, households have more income, which may lead them to save more. Moreover, given the EITC's nature as a lump-sum payment once annually, this could create a form of forced savings. Alternatively, as discussed in Subsection II.B, a key mechanism considered in the context of other need-based programs is that these programs decrease the need for precautionary savings. This is also true for the EITC because, for households in the phase-out region, a negative shock in income is met with an increase in the amount of EITC received. This suggests that the sign should be negative.
To estimate the two effects separately, I add a log function of after-tax earned income (earnings + t(end -earnings)), where end is the end of the phase-out region and t is the EITC phase-out marginal tax rate. 33 Note that actual after-tax income is defined as (agi + t(end -agi)) (assuming agi > earnings), and t changes if households are not located in the phase-out region given their AGI. In this specification, the households that decrease their investment income by the most in response to the tax rate change receive the smallest income treatment by definition because AGI includes investment income. This would create a nontrivial bias in the estimates. Even using earnings in the definition of the proxy for the EITC benefit amount requires a stronger assumption on earnings than before -earnings cannot respond to the marginal tax rate. If earnings respond and the response is positively correlated with the investment income response, this would create a downward bias in the income effect estimates, but I find no evidence that earnings respond. Even if earnings respond, this bias is, by definition, smaller than the bias induced by using AGI because earnings are one component of AGI. The proxy precisely captures the change in the EITC benefit received for a given level of earnings. The income effect term can therefore be interpreted as an ITT estimate.
Empirically, the identification of the income effect separately from the substitution effect comes from two sources. One source is variation in end, which is the end of the phase-out region. The variable end increased for two-child taxpayers in 1996 and married taxpayers in 2002 and 2005. For this analysis to be valid, marital status cannot change endogenously with the changes in end. If more responsive individuals are more likely to get married once end increases, this will bias the income effect estimates upwards. The personal income tax schedule also changed in 2002 and the change affected married, head of household, and single individuals differently. Prior to 2002 all of the households who faced a positive personal income tax rate in the EITC sample examined here faced a 15 percent income tax. In 2002, a new 10 percent bracket was created. With the new 10 percent tax bracket in place, part of the sample examined faced a 10 percent income tax and part of the sample faced a 15 percent income tax. The income thresholds for facing the higher tax rate (with exemptions and the standard deduction taken into account) were similar for those who file as either married or head of household but fairly different for those who file as single. To ensure that there is no differential effect of this tax change that might be attributed to a change in end, I restrict the sample to households that file as either married or as a head of household. 34 The income effect will also be partly identified from variation in t ; changes in t matter for both the substitution and income effect, but they affect each in a different way. Note that without including flexible controls in earnings, identification of the income effect would also come from variation in earnings. 35 However investment income likely increases with earnings, regardless of the tax rate, making this variation invalid.
The results are presented in Table 4 . Column 7 adds the income effect term to the specification from Table 3 , Column 1, and Column 8 does the same for Table 3 , Column 4. There is not enough variation to identify separately the income effect at a statistically significant level. The substitution effect gets slightly larger when controlling for the income effect, but the difference is not statistically significant. When the income effect is positive and it is ignored, the substitution effect estimates should be biased downward, because an increase in the phase-out tax rate usually coincided with an increase in EITC benefits in the period examined.
V. ESTIMATING RESPONSE AT THE SECOND EITC TAX KINK
This section is again focused on estimating the elasticity of investment income but uses a different methodology with unrelated identifying assumptions. I examine the behavior of households whose income places them in the income region around the second tax kink, exploiting the change in the EITC marginal tax rate at the kink. The findings are consistent with the evidence from the last section, pointing to a significant decline in investment income in response to changes in the EITC schedule.
The most common method in the literature used to examine the responsiveness of individuals in the region of the tax kink relies on estimates of bunching in the region around the tax kink and was first proposed by Saez (2010) . In an online appendix, I make some technical improvements to this method and document small but statistically significant elasticities of adjusted gross income at the second EITC kink for both wage-earning and self-employed households. However, this analysis is not informative regarding which types of income are most responsive, nor does the literature have any precedent for such an examination beyond splitting the sample by those with and without a particular type of income (e.g., self-employed income) and examining whether the elasticity is different across the two groups. When the response is on the intensive margin, this approach is valid. However, when the response is on the extensive margin, the response of these households will be captured in the elasticity of those categorized as not having this type of income because the researchers will only observe these households after they have given up this type of income. This is especially problematic for types of unearned 34 Most unmarried individuals with children file as a head of household, so this does not drop many individuals from the sample. 35 A quadratic in earnings is used in the paper; however, the results are not sensitive to including a cubic or quartic polynomial in earnings instead.
income where the likelihood of an extensive margin response is higher. The rest of this section proposes a new alternative method of examining behavior around the tax kink for different types of income to provide some evidence regarding which types of income are the most responsive and are thus contributing to the elasticities found above.
To explain this method, I use the example of investment income and assume that a tax kink is introduced as part of a tax reform, such that the reform discretely increases the marginal tax rate above the tax kink. Suppose individuals are able to bunch perfectly at the tax kink, there is no growth in investment income, and investment income is the only type of income that responds to the increase in the marginal tax rate above the kink. In this case, investment income will decline above the tax kink, as depicted in the top panel of Figure 5 . Note that investment income is a part of AGI, and thus a change in investment income moves a household's location on both the horizontal and vertical axes. Below the tax kink, investment income does not respond. At the tax kink, average income is comprised of all those who were at the kink before the reform, plus all those who move to the kink in response to the tax reform (these are all households whose desired percent decrease in investment income at the new tax rate is at least as large as the gap between their pre-reform AGI and the tax kink). This point in Figure 5 is located half way between the old and new investment income levels, which occurs when there is a uniform distribution of investment income, everyone holds the same amount of investment income pre-reform, and everyone responds in the same way. In general, this point can be anywhere within the old and new levels, or even above the old level. Above the kink, investment income is at a new lower level. Under these assumptions, one could drop the point at the tax kink and then implement a regression discontinuity design to estimate the effect of the higher tax rate above the kink. Dropping the point at the tax kink effectively eliminates all manipulation of the running variable, which would otherwise bias the estimates.
With imperfect bunching and investment income growth, the picture changes to look like that in the bottom panel of Figure 5 ; investment income growth, even without imperfect bunching, mitigates the discrete drop in investment income above the kink if households are responding along the intensive margin. This occurs because households above the kink respond by decreasing their investment income by a certain percentage, but they also started with more investment income. This figure allows other types of income to be growing as well; their rate of growth is a determinant of the slope of investment income. But it assumes investment income is the only type of income that responds to the tax rate. I discuss what happens when this assumption is relaxed below. Imperfect bunching causes investment income to decline once households start responding to the tax kink at -d b ; that is, for a given level of AGI, investment income will be lower. By the time AGI has exceeded the imperfect bunching region at d b , investment income will be at a new, lower growth rate. 36
Notes: This figure shows how a lower bound on the elasticity of response of a given income type X can be calculated in the region around the tax kink. X * + (the solid black line) gives the realized amount of investment income. X * -(the dashed gray line) gives the counterfactual amount of investment income. The shaded region is the implied decline in investment in the region around the tax kink that is due to the increase in marginal tax rate above the kink. By calculating the percent change in average investment income in a region above d b relative to the counterfactual investment income that would have existed absent the tax change, backing out the elasticity of investment income with respect to the marginal net-of-tax rate is straightforward. The counterfactual is empirically constructed from the region [z* -d b -d c ,z* -d b ] for the counterfactual to be valid, investment income must continue to grow at the same rate in the region in which the elasticity is calculated. However, the standard errors on the counterfactual increase as AGI increases above z* -d b , because the accuracy with which I can predict the counterfactual using investment income in the region [-d b -d c ,-d b ] decreases as AGI increases. For this reason, I instead calculate the elasticity in the region of the tax kink [-d b ,d b ] and acknowledge that this is a lower bound on the true elasticity. 37 I will now define some notation, which is depicted in Figure 5 .
Let X * i+ be average investment income for bin i and X * i-be the counterfactual investment income in the same bin. The elasticity can be calculated as follows, Note that this elasticity estimate is also a lower bound on the true elasticity (assuming investment income is increasing, on average, in AGI) because investment income is endogenous with respect to AGI; that is, when investment income declines, so does AGI, pushing down the estimated response at a given AGI level. However, a positive response will be found as long as investment income is not the sole source of growth in AGI. Moreover, this method implicitly assumes that there are no other factors that need to be held fixed in order to obtain a consistent estimate, which makes it possible to obtain a non-causal relationship. For example, suppose earned income decreases in response to the tax rate, but only for those with low investment income. This would lead to a spurious response in investment income. This will be partly ruled out in practice in the discussion that follows. The elasticity estimates from (4) are given in Table 5 . Figure 6 provides the corresponding figures. The standard errors are obtained by a nonparametric bootstrap method clustered by state (1,000 replications). I exclude those with unemployment insurance from the analysis because a decline in unemployment insurance should be accompanied by an increase in earned income; this method is not designed to address this type of mechanical correlation. The first three columns examine the wage-earning sample. Columns 1 and 2 report the results for the two components of AGI -earned and unearned income, respectively. Both the figure and the elasticity estimate for earned income (-0.015) point to the following fact: earned income grew at a faster rate as a fraction of AGI (although not statistically significant) above the tax kink relative to below. This occurs mechanically if other types of income included in AGI are growing slower in response to the higher tax rate and earned income is not responding, or responding in a small way, relative to other types of income that do respond. The mechanical response is small because earned income is a much larger share of AGI than unearned income. In contrast, Figure 6 shows a decline in unearned income above the tax kink. The elasticity is 0.516, but it is statistically insignificant, likely reflecting the volatility of unearned income and that only some types of unearned income are expected to respond. Table 5 , Column 3 and the bottom left panel of Figure 6 examine one type of unearned income -investment income. 38 Although capital gains or losses are a lumpy realization of savings, I include these in this analysis of investment income because most households that have capital gains also have dividend or interest income. If capital gains are excluded, and households respond to the higher marginal tax rate above the tax kink by decreasing capital gains, this will likely bias the estimates downward. Both the figure 1988-2006 1988-2006 1988-2006 1988-1993 d b 3,000 3,000 3,000 2,000 d b 1,000 1,000 1,000 1,000
Notes: Standard errors calculated via non-parametric bootstrap and clustered by state (1,000 replications) are in parentheses. Asterisks denote significance at the 1% (***), 5% (**), and 10% (*) levels.
Notes: All adjusted gross income (AGI) values are in 2006 dollars and renormalized so that the kink (z*) is at zero for all years. The region inside the long-dash vertical lines is used to calculate the elasticity. The counterfactual is given by the dashed gray line and is constructed using income in the region between the short-dashed vertical lines (-4,000 to -3,000 for the top right, top left, and bottom left panels and -3,000 to -2000 for the bottom right panel). The bin size and bandwidth are 31 and 2,518 for earned income and 31 and 3,787 for unearned income. The bin size and bandwidth are 31 and 2,417 for investment income and 88 and 1,384 for self-employment income.
Figure 6
Estimated Average Earned and Unearned Income around the Second EITC Kink and the elasticity provide evidence that investment income declined substantially above the tax kink -the elasticity estimate is 1.558 and is statistically significant at the 10 percent level. In Table 5 , Column 4 and the bottom right panel of Figure 6 , I consider whether self-employment income for self-employed households declined significantly in the region around the kink. Both the figure and the elasticity estimate suggest that it did; however, the estimates are not statistically significant. -5,000 0 5,000 -5,000 -2,500 0 2,500 5,000
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VI. CONCLUSION
When designing the EITC, non-labor income was likely included as a determinant of the amount of EITC received to ensure the credit was going to those who were low-wealth. This paper finds that an unintended consequence of this provision is to distort substantially non-labor income, particularly investment income; in fact, along the intensive margin, the non-labor income distortions are far larger than the earned income distortions for wage-earning households. Such behavior induces deadweight loss because engaging in such behavior is not costless for these households regardless of whether a decline in investment income translates into a decline in savings. To the extent that the behavioral response estimates in this paper reflect an actual decline in savings, this creates additional concerns, particularly because the government would like to encourage low-income households to save more, as evidenced by programs like the Saver's Credit and Individual Development Accounts.
This paper provides evidence that the response in investment income is substantial. Indeed, nearly 40 percent of the decline in saving in income-bearing accounts by EITC recipients over the last two decades can be explained by the changing incentives for saving caused by the EITC schedule. The response is twice as large among those who use a paid preparer, consistent with an increased awareness of the relevant incentives among this group.
The policy implications for EITC design depend on how policymakers weigh the deadweight loss induced by this provision, relative to its original intent -to exclude households that were not actually poor from receiving the EITC. Making the EITC amount exclusively a function of earned income would eliminate the distortion found in this paper but would increase the number of claimants by 8 percent; these additional claimants would receive $76 in benefits at the median, while their median AGI is $48,464.
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